With Malice Toward None

I. Presidential Reconstruction

A. 13th Amendment

1. National Union Party platform--at Lincoln's insistence, the National Union Party adopted a resolution calling for the end of slavery in the United States

2. James M. Ashley--one of the leading Radical Republicans in the House of Representatives, re-introduced the 13th Amendment in that body.

3. 1864 Annual Message--Lincoln attempted to reach out to Democrats of the lame-duck session of the 38th Congress to pass the amendment, since all but four had voted against the amendment in the previous session.

4. Using Presidential "Influence"--Lincoln used a variety of methods to enhance his influence with members of Congress.

B. Peace Overtures--at the time of the Congressional debate over the 13th Amendment, there were also negotiations ongoing with Confederate representatives over ending the war; Lincoln used some obfuscation to calm Democrats excited about the possibility of achieving peace without ending slavery.

1. 1864 Annual Message to Congress--while maintaining that there was no point negotiating with Jefferson Davis, who demanded independence for the South, Lincoln promised generous terms for those states that broke with the Confederacy and rejoined the Union.

2. Northern Peacemakers


3. Southern Peacemakers--While rejecting Blair's plan, Lincoln sent him back with a message that he would be willing to receive a Confederate commission to negotiate peace. By doing so, Lincoln hoped to be able to divide the Confederate government internally, and thus hasten the end of the war.

C. Setting Up Loyal Southern Governments

1. Louisiana--one of the earliest "loyal" governments established in the seceded South, both and the state and local level (New Orleans). Lincoln insisted that he would veto any legislation that did not include recognition of the free-state governments that his administration had established.

2. Presidential Reconstruction--Lincoln's victory in November changed the dynamics of his relationship with Congress, because that body was now more likely to go along with Lincoln's proposals than in his first administration

II. Lincoln's Second Inauguration


A. Lincoln's Turn Toward God--since the death of his young son Willie, Lincoln had increasingly turned to the Bible for solace and strength. The second inaugural address is steeped in biblical imagery.

1. Lincoln's fatalism--Lincoln's fatalism dovetailed with his new-found religious ardor that informs the argument he makes in the Second Inaugural Address, particularly his explanation of why the war has lasted so long and cost so much.

2. "With Malice Toward None ..."--Lincoln also used his 2nd Inaugural Address to encourage the process of sectional reconciliation.

III. The Dead-Enders

A. The Plots to Kidnap Lincoln--as the war went from bad to worse for the Confederacy, plots to kidnap Lincoln and hold him for ransom and the release of prisoners underwent serious consideration

1. Union antecedent--while it is unclear how involved Lincoln was, there was an apparent plot to kidnap Jefferson Davis and other high Confederate officials that failed, and may have prompted consideration of their own plots.


B. John Wilkes Booth--a member of the first family of the American theater, Booth was an ardent white supremacist who viewed slavery as beneficial for both the slave owner and the slave.

1. Delusional alcoholic--a talented actor, Booth became increasingly delusional and spent much of his time while conscious drinking.

IV. Assessing Lincoln

The 1864 Election

I. Republican challengers

A. John C. Fremont--never really became a serious challenger, although he had the backing of a large contingent of German-Americans in Missouri, who were angered by how Fremont was treated in 1861 (as he was), and had always been suspicious of Lincoln and the Know-Nothing rumors that swirled around him.

B. Salmon Chase--the most serious Lincoln challenger--even though he was still serving as Lincoln's secretary of Treasury at the time. By early 1864, Chase had come to respect Lincoln's abilities, but still felt that he was more intelligent and would make a better president. Chase also felt he got little credit for the tremendous job he was doing as Secretary of the Treasury--a slight he attributed to Lincoln's lack of administrative ability, since the departments of War and Navy spent money faster than Chase could raise it.

1. Lincoln's supporters--had been working assiduously to get Lincoln renominated at the upcoming Republican convention (which was renamed the Unionist convention, in an attempt to persuade War Democrats to vote for Lincoln in the fall). William E. Chandler used the occasion of the New Hampshire Republican Convention--set to nominate Gov.Joseph Gilmore for another term--to push through a resolution declaring Lincoln "the people's choice for re-election to the Presidency in 1864." Simon Cameron, Lincoln's first War Secretary, obtained signatures from all Republican lawmakers in Pennsylvania requesting that Lincoln allow himself to be re-nominated. Other political activists in the North used the Union Leagues to organize support for Lincoln in their states.

2. Chase's supporters--were caught off-guard by this early action on the part of Lincoln supporters, and had to scramble to catch up. Chase had built a base of support within the Treasury Department, which with the expansion of the department with patronage jobs due to the passage of the Internal Revenue Act of 1862. Chase also had considerable support among Radical Republicans who, like Chase, considered Lincoln too cautious and meek on the issue of the abolition of slavery.

a.Pomeroy Circular--in February 1864, Chase supporters--including Ohio Sen. John Sherman and Rep. Thomas Ashley--circulated a pamphlet entitled The Next Presidential Election, which claimed that "The people have lost all confidence in [Lincoln's] ability to suppress the rebellion and restore the Union," and that the next Republican candidate must be "an advanced thinker; a statesman profoundly versed in political and economic science, one who fully comprehends the spirit of the age." This pamphlet came on a little too strong for many, however, and Chase quickly disavowed any responsibility for it.

Undeterred, Chase's backers attempted a second circular just weeks later, mailed out under the signature of Sen. Samuel C. Pomeroy of Kansas, mailed to hundreds of Republicans that claimed that re-electing Lincoln was "practically impossible." Chase again had to disavow any knowledge of the letter, and offered his resignation as Treasury secretary. Lincoln left Chase dangling for several week. By the time Lincoln wrote a letter asking Chase to stay on, his forces in Indiana and Chase's home state of Ohio had petitioned Lincoln to run again, and Chase had been savaged on the floor of the Senate by Frank Blair. Tired of the abuse, Chase withdrew his name for consideration for nomination on March 5

C. U.S. Grant--Grant, a hero when he arrived in the East from the West after Vicksburg, was the candidate favored by Radicals after Chase dropped out of consideration--but Grant had no political ambitions before the war was concluded--which he stated to Lincoln both before and after he assumed command of the Army and particularly the Army of the Potomac.

C. Winning the Nomination

1. Baltimore Convention--held in early June 1864, the convention nominated Lincoln by unanimous consent.


2. Nominating the Vice-President--some historians claim the nomination of Andrew Johnson to be Lincoln's greatest mistake. The evidence suggests that Lincoln simply had no preference for his vice-presidential running mate--because the job was not very important, and Lincoln had no idea that he would be killed in office. Hannibal Hamlin was an ardent abolitionist, and the other viable candidate was from New York, which would mean that William H. Seward would have to resign because by tradition no state held more than one high federal office at a time. This left Johnson, who proved loyal to the Union and to Lincoln--and his nomination was hoped to encourage the border states not to secede, and to encourage seceded states to re-enter the Union.

II. Grant Takes Command


A. Strategy--Grant initially planned a multi-front attack to use the superior numbers of the Union forces to wear down the Confederates; the political generals (Banks, Sigel, and Butler) were not up to the task, however, and the war bogged down as the summer months progressed.

B. Battle Losses--Lincoln found in Grant his ideal general, one who was willing to carry the fight to the Confederates. Grant's tenacity had severe consequences, however, as the Army of the Potomac took nearly 100,000 casualties in the first half of 1864.

C. Civilian Morale--many in the North lost confidence in the abilities of Grant; even Mary Lincoln referred to him as "a butcher, unfit for command." Lincoln retained his confidence in Grant, however--perhaps because he had to, since there were no other generals to turn to.


1. Wade-Davis bill--the growing frustration on the part of Radical Republicans with the course of the war, and with what they saw as Lincoln's foot-dragging on abolition, found an outlet with the Wade-Davis bill. Named after its two principal sponsors, Radical Republicans Sen. Benjamin Wade and Rep. Henry Winter Davis, the bill asserted the primacy of Congress over reconstruction, rather than the Executive Branch. It stipulated that any state seeking readmission to the Union had to first abolish slavery; that 50 percent of 1860 voters must participate in elections to reconstitute their state governments, rather than the 10 percent in Lincoln's plan; and that the electors of the state conventions to vote on these matters had to take an "iron-clad" pledge that they had never voluntarily borne arms against the United States, or aided the rebellion--rather than the simple promise not to do so in the future, as the Lincoln plan required.

The severity of this bill caused Lincoln to oppose it. Because it was voted on near the end of the first session of that Congress, Lincoln simply "pocketed" the veto--although he issued a statement giving his reasons for acting in that manner; both actions were highly unusual, and further angered Radicals, who began to work against his nomination once again.

D. Peace Overtures--war weariness on both sides prompted calls for peace negotiations; both the Union and Confederate sides agrees several negotiation sessions, but the seriousness of their negotiations remains in question.


1. The Greeley negotiations--word was passed to Greeley, editor of the influential New York Tribune that negotiators from the Confederacy were in Canada to negotiate the end of hostilities. Lincoln already had a team meeting secretly in Richmond, but knew that Greeley could expose these new negotiations--which Lincoln suspected were more meant to influence the fall elections, rather than any serious peace negotiation--instructed Greeley to act as emissary, and stated that the US was willing to negotiate as long as the Confederacy met two preconditions--the "restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole union, and the abandonment of slavery." Lincoln new this last pre-condition would never be met; he wanted to avoid this so that the South would not ask for an armistice. Outraged, the Southern representatives saw that Lincoln's "To Whom It May Concern" letter was quickly published; this cost him support by both War Democrats (who had no interest in fighting for African American freedom), and Radical Republicans, who so the move as a clumsy ploy for their support in the upcoming elections.

III. Democratic Convention


A. Peace Candidate/War Platform-by the time the Democratic Party met for their nominating convention in late August 1864, the tide of the war had turned once again; Sherman captured Atlanta just as the convention was ending, making much of the peace platform moot.

B. War Candidate/Peace Platform--McClellan was a compromise candidate of a badly divided party. While he himself favored the war, part of a compromise that handed him the nomination left the writing of the platform to prominent Copperhead Clement Vallandigham.

C. McClellan's Dilemna--McClellan still viewed Lincoln as a fool, who meddled too much in military afairs, but even though he repudiated this party's platform, it still hung like a millstone around his neck during the campaign

IV. Grant Takes Command--Redux


A. Strategy--with the coming of fall, the constant contact that Grant and his generals maintained with the opposing Confederate forces (along with Jefferson Davis' replacement of Joseph Johnston with John Bell Hood in the defense of Atlanta) led to Union forces regaining momentum.

B. Battle Victories


1. Sheridan at Cedar Creek--Sheridan's battlefield leadership turned certain defeat against the forces led by Jubal Early into one of the most decisive victories the Union forces experienced

C. Civilian Morale--the string of decisive Union victories led many three-year volunteers, who had been leaving the Union army, to re-enlist to get in on what they undoubtedly saw as payback for the many defeats they had suffered for the previous three years.

V. The Fall Election--and Its Aftermath

A. Lincoln's Victory--Lincoln won the popular vote by more than 400,000, and took all states casting electoral votes (that is, all but the seceded states) except Kentucky, Delaware, and New Jersey; for the first time, states allowed soldiers in the field to vote, and Lincoln gained 70 percent of those votes.

1. Military success--bred electoral success. When the Union army began piling up victories, it became much easier to reconcile both wings of the party. Lincoln also made concessions to both wings of the party, asking for the resignation of Montgomery Blair (whose family made enemies of the Radical wing), and eventually appointing Salmon Chase chief justice when Roger Taney died; with Chase out as Treasury secretary, it was also easier to keep Thurlow Weed happy in New York.

B. Republican Victory--the Republican Party not only retained the White House, but also made significant gains in both the House and the Senate.


C. 13th Amendment--was first introduced in January 1864, and passed in the Senate--but failed to pass in the House of Representative. The amendment was subsequently re-introduced by Rep. James M. Ashley (of Toledo), and subsequently championed by Pres. Lincoln during the summer of 1864. The amendment passed in January of 1865, and was ratified by the states by the end of that year.

Final (Optional) Writing Assignment

CSA: Confederate States of America (the movie we watched in class) engaged in what is known as “alternative” history—that is, history that did not happen, but could have occurred had conditions been different. In a 4-5 page paper, I would like you to explore some alternative history, as well. In late 1863, Lincoln proposed a plan for reconstruction of the South—of transforming Southern society without slavery. Based upon your reading, and the lectures in class, how would Lincoln’s implementation of reconstruction differed from what actually occurred? Give specific reasons for these differences based upon Lincoln’s statements.

This final paper is due at the same time as the take-home final exam—December 15, 2009, at 10:15 am.