Lincoln and Emancipation

I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored; the nearer the Union will be "the Union as it was." If there be those who would not save the Union, unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors; and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views.
--Abraham Lincoln to Horace Greeley, August 22, 1862

I. Emancipation and the War

A. Slavery and the Reasons for War--While most involved in 1861 would agree that slavery was the root cause of the war, few whites could be found who would advocate ending slavery as a way to shorten or end the war.

1. Proponents of Compromise--a number of Northern politicians advocated compromise with the Southern States as a means to end the secession crisis

2. Lincoln's refusal to compromise--Lincoln was willing to compromise with political opponents on a number of issues, but not on the issue of the extension of slavery.

a. Politics as the Art of Compromise--and Lincoln was a master politician

b. Lincoln to Lyman Trumbull on the issue of popular sovereignty in the Crittenden Compromise--"Stand firm. The tug has to come, and better now, than anytime hereafter."

c. Lincoln had long been an opponent of the expansion of slavery; this was the cornerstone principle of the Republican Party; Lincoln never compromised on this principle.

B. Lincoln's 1st Inaugural Address--"One section of our country believes slavery is right, and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is wrong, and ought to be restricted. That is the only substantial dispute."

1. 1st Inaugural Address Intended Audience--not really an attempt to persuade the South to give up the idea of secession, but to steel the resolve of people in the North for the coming battle.

2. Lincoln's promise not to interfere with slavery--"as it currently existed."

3. Lincoln maintained that he was upholding the law--that secession was unconstitutional, and as president he was sworn to uphold the constitution and the law.


C. Letters home--while newspapers were an important source of news and opinion, letters home from soldiers were also important in helping to shift public opinion on the emancipation of slaves.


1. Slaves as a Confederate source of labor--it quickly became apparent to soldiers that slaves performed much of the labor in the South, and that undercutting that source of labor would also undermine the war effort in that region.


2. Inhumanity of slavery--Southern insistence of the benign nature of slavery was undermined by the evidence of mistreatment as slaves began to stream into Union camps during the war.

II. Increased Influence of Abolitionists

A. Democratic void--with the withdrawal of Southern Democrats, abolitionists in the Republican Party became more influential, and the were able to pull the bodies politic into adapting more radical legislation--particularly when the war was going badly for the Union side.

1. McClelland's political ambitions--McClelland probably had political ambitions from the beginning, which may help to explain his lack of military success.

2.The momentum of war--the need to "rally 'round the flag" stunted early criticism of the war, and also the opposition to much of Lincoln's agenda.

B. Emancipation as a Tool of War

1. Striking at the Southern labor force.

2. Increasing Northern sentiment for a "hard" war--the early Confederate successes led many in the North to call for the prosecution of a "hard" war, that would be more debilitating on the South.

3. Slave as a "fifth column"--undoubtedly, some saw the potential of the promise of emancipation motivating slaves to act as a subversive force within the Confederacy.

III. Emancipation as a Wartime Expedient


A. Contrabands

1. Self-liberation--slaves quickly grasped the importance of the conflict, and many chose to liberate themselves.

2. Contraband--by military law, contraband property can be seized during a conflict, but must be returned to its lawful owner at the end of hostilities.

3. Gen. Benjamin Butler--commanded Fortress Monroe in May 1861 when a Confederate officer, claiming rights under the Fugitive Slave Act, demanded the return of his property. Butler refused (pointing out that Virginia claimed to be a sovereign nation, and therefore no longer covered by the Fugitive Slave Act), declaring the slaves "contraband."

a. Policy approved by Secretary of War Simon Cameron.

b. Butler's actions were not widely imitated--many Union generals were fearful of becoming responsible for a large number of escaped slaves, who they would then have to care for--one of the reasons most of these generals advised Lincoln against issuing an emancipation proclamation.

C. Who Decides Upon Emancipation?

1. John C. Fremont--Lincoln countermanded his emancipation of a select number of slaves in Missouri under martial law; later did the same when another Union general at Port Royal, SC, emancipated slaves under his command.

2. Bills of Attainder--Congress is prohibited by the Constitution from passing bills of attainder, or the uncompensated seizure of personal property; since slaves were considered personal property of slave owners, it was generally agreed--with important exceptions--that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to free the slaves.

3. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces--Lincoln argued that he alone, in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, had the authority to emancipate the slaves as a wartime expediency; Lincoln recognized that this authority would cease at the end of hostilities, but also recognized that the cat would be out of the bag by then, and wary about being placed back in.

IV. Emancipation and Political Expediency

A. Retaining the Loyalty of the Border States--Lincoln thought it necessary to retain the loyalty of the slave holding border states while the question of emancipation hung in the balance, or emancipation would become a moot point because the Confederacy would prevail.

1. Gradual, compensated emancipation--Lincoln proposed that slave owners in the border states be compensated, and the emancipated slaves colonized (South America? Caribbean?)

a. Rejected by border state politicians

b. The failure of gradual emancipation helped push Lincoln to acceptance of immediate emancipation, proclaimed by presidential fiat.


B. Antietam/Sharpsburg--Lee's defeat, after a long string of victories, provided Lincoln the opportunity to issue a preliminary emancipation proclamation that he had prepared a month previously

1. Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation--gave the states of the Confederacy 100 days (from September 22,1862 when it was issued to January 1, 1863) to surrender and retain their slaves, or to face the prospect of uncompensated emancipation in defeat.

C. Electoral setback--this proclamation cost the Republican Party in the 1862 elections, cutting into their numbers in both the House and the Senate. Lincoln was an astute politician, but one of strong moral principles, as well (LBJ and the Voting Rights/Civil Rights legislation?)