With Malice Toward None

I. Presidential Reconstruction

A. 13th Amendment

1. National Union Party platform--at Lincoln's insistence, the National Union Party adopted a resolution calling for the end of slavery in the United States

2. James M. Ashley--one of the leading Radical Republicans in the House of Representatives, re-introduced the 13th Amendment in that body.

3. 1864 Annual Message--Lincoln attempted to reach out to Democrats of the lame-duck session of the 38th Congress to pass the amendment, since all but four had voted against the amendment in the previous session.

4. Using Presidential "Influence"--Lincoln used a variety of methods to enhance his influence with members of Congress.

B. Peace Overtures--at the time of the Congressional debate over the 13th Amendment, there were also negotiations ongoing with Confederate representatives over ending the war; Lincoln used some obfuscation to calm Democrats excited about the possibility of achieving peace without ending slavery.

1. 1864 Annual Message to Congress--while maintaining that there was no point negotiating with Jefferson Davis, who demanded independence for the South, Lincoln promised generous terms for those states that broke with the Confederacy and rejoined the Union.

2. Northern Peacemakers


3. Southern Peacemakers--While rejecting Blair's plan, Lincoln sent him back with a message that he would be willing to receive a Confederate commission to negotiate peace. By doing so, Lincoln hoped to be able to divide the Confederate government internally, and thus hasten the end of the war.

C. Setting Up Loyal Southern Governments

1. Louisiana--one of the earliest "loyal" governments established in the seceded South, both and the state and local level (New Orleans). Lincoln insisted that he would veto any legislation that did not include recognition of the free-state governments that his administration had established.

2. Presidential Reconstruction--Lincoln's victory in November changed the dynamics of his relationship with Congress, because that body was now more likely to go along with Lincoln's proposals than in his first administration

II. Lincoln's Second Inauguration


A. Lincoln's Turn Toward God--since the death of his young son Willie, Lincoln had increasingly turned to the Bible for solace and strength. The second inaugural address is steeped in biblical imagery.

1. Lincoln's fatalism--Lincoln's fatalism dovetailed with his new-found religious ardor that informs the argument he makes in the Second Inaugural Address, particularly his explanation of why the war has lasted so long and cost so much.

2. "With Malice Toward None ..."--Lincoln also used his 2nd Inaugural Address to encourage the process of sectional reconciliation.

III. The Dead-Enders

A. The Plots to Kidnap Lincoln--as the war went from bad to worse for the Confederacy, plots to kidnap Lincoln and hold him for ransom and the release of prisoners underwent serious consideration

1. Union antecedent--while it is unclear how involved Lincoln was, there was an apparent plot to kidnap Jefferson Davis and other high Confederate officials that failed, and may have prompted consideration of their own plots.


B. John Wilkes Booth--a member of the first family of the American theater, Booth was an ardent white supremacist who viewed slavery as beneficial for both the slave owner and the slave.

1. Delusional alcoholic--a talented actor, Booth became increasingly delusional and spent much of his time while conscious drinking.

IV. Assessing Lincoln

The 1864 Election

I. Republican challengers

A. John C. Fremont--never really became a serious challenger, although he had the backing of a large contingent of German-Americans in Missouri, who were angered by how Fremont was treated in 1861 (as he was), and had always been suspicious of Lincoln and the Know-Nothing rumors that swirled around him.

B. Salmon Chase--the most serious Lincoln challenger--even though he was still serving as Lincoln's secretary of Treasury at the time. By early 1864, Chase had come to respect Lincoln's abilities, but still felt that he was more intelligent and would make a better president. Chase also felt he got little credit for the tremendous job he was doing as Secretary of the Treasury--a slight he attributed to Lincoln's lack of administrative ability, since the departments of War and Navy spent money faster than Chase could raise it.

1. Lincoln's supporters--had been working assiduously to get Lincoln renominated at the upcoming Republican convention (which was renamed the Unionist convention, in an attempt to persuade War Democrats to vote for Lincoln in the fall). William E. Chandler used the occasion of the New Hampshire Republican Convention--set to nominate Gov.Joseph Gilmore for another term--to push through a resolution declaring Lincoln "the people's choice for re-election to the Presidency in 1864." Simon Cameron, Lincoln's first War Secretary, obtained signatures from all Republican lawmakers in Pennsylvania requesting that Lincoln allow himself to be re-nominated. Other political activists in the North used the Union Leagues to organize support for Lincoln in their states.

2. Chase's supporters--were caught off-guard by this early action on the part of Lincoln supporters, and had to scramble to catch up. Chase had built a base of support within the Treasury Department, which with the expansion of the department with patronage jobs due to the passage of the Internal Revenue Act of 1862. Chase also had considerable support among Radical Republicans who, like Chase, considered Lincoln too cautious and meek on the issue of the abolition of slavery.

a.Pomeroy Circular--in February 1864, Chase supporters--including Ohio Sen. John Sherman and Rep. Thomas Ashley--circulated a pamphlet entitled The Next Presidential Election, which claimed that "The people have lost all confidence in [Lincoln's] ability to suppress the rebellion and restore the Union," and that the next Republican candidate must be "an advanced thinker; a statesman profoundly versed in political and economic science, one who fully comprehends the spirit of the age." This pamphlet came on a little too strong for many, however, and Chase quickly disavowed any responsibility for it.

Undeterred, Chase's backers attempted a second circular just weeks later, mailed out under the signature of Sen. Samuel C. Pomeroy of Kansas, mailed to hundreds of Republicans that claimed that re-electing Lincoln was "practically impossible." Chase again had to disavow any knowledge of the letter, and offered his resignation as Treasury secretary. Lincoln left Chase dangling for several week. By the time Lincoln wrote a letter asking Chase to stay on, his forces in Indiana and Chase's home state of Ohio had petitioned Lincoln to run again, and Chase had been savaged on the floor of the Senate by Frank Blair. Tired of the abuse, Chase withdrew his name for consideration for nomination on March 5

C. U.S. Grant--Grant, a hero when he arrived in the East from the West after Vicksburg, was the candidate favored by Radicals after Chase dropped out of consideration--but Grant had no political ambitions before the war was concluded--which he stated to Lincoln both before and after he assumed command of the Army and particularly the Army of the Potomac.

C. Winning the Nomination

1. Baltimore Convention--held in early June 1864, the convention nominated Lincoln by unanimous consent.


2. Nominating the Vice-President--some historians claim the nomination of Andrew Johnson to be Lincoln's greatest mistake. The evidence suggests that Lincoln simply had no preference for his vice-presidential running mate--because the job was not very important, and Lincoln had no idea that he would be killed in office. Hannibal Hamlin was an ardent abolitionist, and the other viable candidate was from New York, which would mean that William H. Seward would have to resign because by tradition no state held more than one high federal office at a time. This left Johnson, who proved loyal to the Union and to Lincoln--and his nomination was hoped to encourage the border states not to secede, and to encourage seceded states to re-enter the Union.

II. Grant Takes Command


A. Strategy--Grant initially planned a multi-front attack to use the superior numbers of the Union forces to wear down the Confederates; the political generals (Banks, Sigel, and Butler) were not up to the task, however, and the war bogged down as the summer months progressed.

B. Battle Losses--Lincoln found in Grant his ideal general, one who was willing to carry the fight to the Confederates. Grant's tenacity had severe consequences, however, as the Army of the Potomac took nearly 100,000 casualties in the first half of 1864.

C. Civilian Morale--many in the North lost confidence in the abilities of Grant; even Mary Lincoln referred to him as "a butcher, unfit for command." Lincoln retained his confidence in Grant, however--perhaps because he had to, since there were no other generals to turn to.


1. Wade-Davis bill--the growing frustration on the part of Radical Republicans with the course of the war, and with what they saw as Lincoln's foot-dragging on abolition, found an outlet with the Wade-Davis bill. Named after its two principal sponsors, Radical Republicans Sen. Benjamin Wade and Rep. Henry Winter Davis, the bill asserted the primacy of Congress over reconstruction, rather than the Executive Branch. It stipulated that any state seeking readmission to the Union had to first abolish slavery; that 50 percent of 1860 voters must participate in elections to reconstitute their state governments, rather than the 10 percent in Lincoln's plan; and that the electors of the state conventions to vote on these matters had to take an "iron-clad" pledge that they had never voluntarily borne arms against the United States, or aided the rebellion--rather than the simple promise not to do so in the future, as the Lincoln plan required.

The severity of this bill caused Lincoln to oppose it. Because it was voted on near the end of the first session of that Congress, Lincoln simply "pocketed" the veto--although he issued a statement giving his reasons for acting in that manner; both actions were highly unusual, and further angered Radicals, who began to work against his nomination once again.

D. Peace Overtures--war weariness on both sides prompted calls for peace negotiations; both the Union and Confederate sides agrees several negotiation sessions, but the seriousness of their negotiations remains in question.


1. The Greeley negotiations--word was passed to Greeley, editor of the influential New York Tribune that negotiators from the Confederacy were in Canada to negotiate the end of hostilities. Lincoln already had a team meeting secretly in Richmond, but knew that Greeley could expose these new negotiations--which Lincoln suspected were more meant to influence the fall elections, rather than any serious peace negotiation--instructed Greeley to act as emissary, and stated that the US was willing to negotiate as long as the Confederacy met two preconditions--the "restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole union, and the abandonment of slavery." Lincoln new this last pre-condition would never be met; he wanted to avoid this so that the South would not ask for an armistice. Outraged, the Southern representatives saw that Lincoln's "To Whom It May Concern" letter was quickly published; this cost him support by both War Democrats (who had no interest in fighting for African American freedom), and Radical Republicans, who so the move as a clumsy ploy for their support in the upcoming elections.

III. Democratic Convention


A. Peace Candidate/War Platform-by the time the Democratic Party met for their nominating convention in late August 1864, the tide of the war had turned once again; Sherman captured Atlanta just as the convention was ending, making much of the peace platform moot.

B. War Candidate/Peace Platform--McClellan was a compromise candidate of a badly divided party. While he himself favored the war, part of a compromise that handed him the nomination left the writing of the platform to prominent Copperhead Clement Vallandigham.

C. McClellan's Dilemna--McClellan still viewed Lincoln as a fool, who meddled too much in military afairs, but even though he repudiated this party's platform, it still hung like a millstone around his neck during the campaign

IV. Grant Takes Command--Redux


A. Strategy--with the coming of fall, the constant contact that Grant and his generals maintained with the opposing Confederate forces (along with Jefferson Davis' replacement of Joseph Johnston with John Bell Hood in the defense of Atlanta) led to Union forces regaining momentum.

B. Battle Victories


1. Sheridan at Cedar Creek--Sheridan's battlefield leadership turned certain defeat against the forces led by Jubal Early into one of the most decisive victories the Union forces experienced

C. Civilian Morale--the string of decisive Union victories led many three-year volunteers, who had been leaving the Union army, to re-enlist to get in on what they undoubtedly saw as payback for the many defeats they had suffered for the previous three years.

V. The Fall Election--and Its Aftermath

A. Lincoln's Victory--Lincoln won the popular vote by more than 400,000, and took all states casting electoral votes (that is, all but the seceded states) except Kentucky, Delaware, and New Jersey; for the first time, states allowed soldiers in the field to vote, and Lincoln gained 70 percent of those votes.

1. Military success--bred electoral success. When the Union army began piling up victories, it became much easier to reconcile both wings of the party. Lincoln also made concessions to both wings of the party, asking for the resignation of Montgomery Blair (whose family made enemies of the Radical wing), and eventually appointing Salmon Chase chief justice when Roger Taney died; with Chase out as Treasury secretary, it was also easier to keep Thurlow Weed happy in New York.

B. Republican Victory--the Republican Party not only retained the White House, but also made significant gains in both the House and the Senate.


C. 13th Amendment--was first introduced in January 1864, and passed in the Senate--but failed to pass in the House of Representative. The amendment was subsequently re-introduced by Rep. James M. Ashley (of Toledo), and subsequently championed by Pres. Lincoln during the summer of 1864. The amendment passed in January of 1865, and was ratified by the states by the end of that year.

Final (Optional) Writing Assignment

CSA: Confederate States of America (the movie we watched in class) engaged in what is known as “alternative” history—that is, history that did not happen, but could have occurred had conditions been different. In a 4-5 page paper, I would like you to explore some alternative history, as well. In late 1863, Lincoln proposed a plan for reconstruction of the South—of transforming Southern society without slavery. Based upon your reading, and the lectures in class, how would Lincoln’s implementation of reconstruction differed from what actually occurred? Give specific reasons for these differences based upon Lincoln’s statements.

This final paper is due at the same time as the take-home final exam—December 15, 2009, at 10:15 am.

Reconstruction

I. The Political Terrain

A. Foreign Policy

1. Great Britain--the British government, under heavy pressure from the US ambassador Charles Adams, seized the gunboat/ram being constructed at the Laird shipyards that could have wreacked havoc with the Union blockade.

2. Russia--the appearence of Russian ships in Union ports on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts (done so they would not be bottled up in the Baltic Sea when the expected war with Great Britain occurred) boosted the confidence of northerners who assumed this meant that Russia would back the North if Great Britain favored the Confederacy in the conflict.

B. Domestic Policy

1. Congress--although the Republican majority in the House was smaller, the Republican Party still controlled the two elected branches of government (the Presidency, as well as both the House and Senate)


C. Friction in the Confederacy--just as dissatisfaction with the course of the ware provided support to the oppostion in the North in the 1862 elections, Confederate dissatisfaction with the war in 1863 cost Jefferson Davis support in the Confederate elections.

1. Lack of political parties--the lack of political parties--or "factions," to recall the term used during the Early National period--was viewed as a strength of the Confederacy by contemporaries. Historians have come to view this as a weakness, however, because political parties served to focus support for particular political program--or to serve as a focused way to work against that political agenda; without political parties, controversial policies simply divided the government.

2. Centrifugal force of States Rights--besides the issue of slavery, the only other political program popular in the South was the supremacy of state's political agenda over the national government's--States Rights. Because of deeply held political ideal, it was challenging for the national government--the Confederacy--to get the various states to live up to their obligations. This became particularly evident as the war began going badly for the South.

3. Growing Peace Movement--the Confederacy was never the monolithic "Solid South"; there were always pockets of resistance to the war wherever slavery was unimportant to the local economy--and therefore where there was little support to fight a war to keep that institution.

a. Wartime inflation--a barrel of flour in Richmond, for instance, cost $100 by the fall of 1863; other materials were even higher

b. Defeat at Gettysburg--demoralized much of the civilian population of the region, especially after a string of Confederate victories seemed to promise victory in the near future.

c. Strongest Confederate government support came from those Congressmen sitting from states largely under Union control, or which had never left the Union--who were willing to "go to the last ditch" because they had no stake in surrender.

II. Reconstruction--is generally assumed to have begun after Appomattox, when the military struggle ended; but it is now recognized that the political groundwork for reconstruction began much earlier.

A. Three Plans for Reconstruction

1. Pro-Confederate Plan--called for Lincoln to rescind the Emancipation Proclamation, offer general amnesty to all rebels, and pretend the whole episode never happened.

2. Conservative Republican plan--insist on southern acceptance of the emancipation of slaves, but made few other demands that former Confederates would have to meet. With this generous plan, conservatives expected that individual southerners would surrender quickly and overthrow the leadership that led them into the war.

3. Radical Republican plan--sought equality for African Americans with white southerners, and to completely reorganize Southern society to achieve this aim.


a. Thaddeus Stevens--argued that the seceded states should be treated as conquered territory, and that property be confiscated and distributed to poor loyal southern whites and African Americans.


b. Charles Sumner--argued that seceded states "gave-up" all claims to statehood, and that their fate should be determined by Congress--just like territories.

B. Republican schism--these differing visions over reconstruction by Republicans threatened party unity--and the parties ability to carry out a reconstruction plan.

C. Lincoln's Vision of Reconstruction

1. 1863 Amnesty Proclamation--Lincoln sent an Amnesty Proclamation with his 1863 message to Congress, laying out his proposal on the treatment of rebellious individuals.

a. "... full pardon ... with restoration of all rights of property except as to slaves." Confederate government officials and high-ranking military officers (above colonel) were excepted from this pardon. To be granted this pardon, former rebels would also have to take a loyalty oath to the Constitution, and to pledge to obey acts of Congress and presidential proclamations relating to slavery.

2. 1863 Message to Congress--served as a sort of state of the union address. The early part of the message was a simple recounting of the accomplishments of the Lincoln administration; much of it was written by cabinet officials, and combined into a single document. The end of the document, however, laid out Lincoln's proposals for reconstruction.

a. Pledged to uphold the Emancipation Proclamation, but at the same time did not propose and ending for slavery in the loyal border states. Lincoln also promised that no slave freed by military conquest or the Proclamation would be forced back into slavery--as long as the Supreme Court decided that Lincoln did not exceed his authority in doing so.

b. Proposed to allow states that had seceded, but since come under Union control, to reorganize politically if ten percent of the population that had voted in the 1860 election took a loyalty oath and petitioned to form a new government. This "Ten Percent Solution" raised few concerns among Republicans initially, but Democrats accused Lincoln of a bald power grab, particularly since a reconstructed Arkansas or Louisiana could have as many electoral votes as the state of Ohio or Indiana.



3. Lincoln's changed perception of the war--Lincoln had long believed that most Southerners were simply led astray by their political leaders; this view began to change as the reality that many Southerners willingly were led to rebellion began to take hold.

a. Military Districts--when portions of southern states were reclaimed, they were divided into military districts to provide basic services (police protection, as well as an occupying force to ensure that rebel forces did not retake an area). Lincoln also moved loyal civilian officials into these areas, to begin the process of reintegrating them into the US body politic. In practice, many of the civilian officials were fiercely loyal to Lincoln, and came under some criticism--as did their boss--for their political activity on the part of Lincoln.

b. Reconstruction as a wartime expedient--for Lincoln, reconstruction served not only as a vision for transforming the postwar South, but also as a way to try to persuade Southerners to lay down their arms.

D. Splitting the Difference--as was his usual practice, Lincoln gave each side in the Republican Party something that they could claim as being cognizant with their own position--and thus to support his own position.

1. Conservative Republicans--could claim that Lincoln agreed with their position that the war was provoked by the disloyalty of individual Southerners; they had to pledge their loyalty as individuals, and leaders of southern society (politicians and military officers) were to be treated differently, reflecting their greater responsibility in the rebellion.

2. Radical Republicans--could also claim the President was sympathetic to several of their positions.

a. Promised that Southerners would have to accept emancipation of slaves as an essential condition for reconstruction.

b. Promised that freed slaves (via the Emancipation Proclamation) would never be restored to their masters.

c. Requirement that all citizens in seceded states be required to take an oath of loyalty before partaking in any rights of citizenship satisfied radicals on the issue over how to distinguish loyal from disloyal.

3. Effect of the Statement--miraculously, this statement appeased both wings of the Republican Party, as well as a fraction of War Democrats, and helped Lincoln stave off challengers from both within the party as well as a Democratic challenger in 1864.

The Gettysburg Address

The Gilbert Text of the Gettysburg Address:

AP reporter Joseph L. Gilbert was granted permission to look at Lincoln's written address, which he copied verbatim, and is in my judgment the most accurate report of what Lincoln actually said that day.

The Battle of Gettysburg had resulted in somewhere between 46,000 and 51,000 casualties, with the Union side suffering some 23,055 (3,155 killed, 14,531 wounded, 5,369 captured or missing), and the Confederate side 23,231 (4,708 killed, 12,693 wounded, 5,830 captured or missing)--although the numbers on the Confederate side are probably not as accurate as the Union side. In addition to the human carnage, approximately 3,000 horse carcasses where burned to clear the battlefield. Most of the fallen soldiers were buried in hastily-dug shallow graves, and some were dug up by pigs and parts of the carcasses consumed.

The Response of the Citizens of Gettysburg was to begin an effort to raise money to turn part of the battlefield into a proper cemetery, since exposed bodies reflected badly on the town--and would have been disturbing for the towns people, as well. A young, prominent local attorney by the name of David Wills stepped in, realizing how long it would take to raise private money, and convinced the governor of Pennsylvania to put up a portion of state money, and to convince other governors whose soldiers had fallen at Gettysburg to follow suit. With this money promised, Wills was authorized to purchase the land for the cemetery.


The Greek Revival--with Greece fighting for independence from the Ottoman Empire in the 1830s and 1840s, an interest in all things Greek was sparked. This was reflected in the architecture of the time--Greek Revival. This carried over into politics, as well, with a greater interest in democracy, rather than in republican institutions. The renewed interest in democracy carried with it the desire to promote the equality of all people. During the heyday of Greek Revival architecture, there were movement started for the abolition of slavery, the rights of women, and extending the right to vote to all.


Planning the Cemetery--the Soldier's National Cemetery at Gettysburg was part of the rural cemetery's movement, which saw the development of other cemeteries as "places of repose" that could be harmonized with nature, and which could be utilized by the survivors to commune with the deceased--again, the revival of an idea first expressed by the Greeks. In fact, the word cemetery derives from the Greek word koimētērion, meaning a place of repose.

William Saunders, a leading landscape architect, designed the burial grounds at Gettysburg. The difficulty in identifying many of the remains contributed to his idea of making no distinction of rank in interring the dead, which reflected in turn the ideals of equality--and which were reflected in Lincoln's speech.


The Invitation--although Lincoln was not formally invited to make an address until November 2, he was expecting such an invitation. Wills initially planned the ceremony for the middle of October. He invited Edward Everett, the leading orator of this age, to make the main address. Everett told Wills he would need more time for research and writing his two-hour address, which then pushed back the date of the ceremony. While Lincoln was not formally invited until two and a half weeks before the event, he expected to be invited, and was preparing his address well ahead of the invitation.


Getting to Gettysburg--the importance Lincoln placed on this address is reflected in the journey he took to get there. Just before he was scheduled to leave, his young son Tad became seriously ill. Losing another son to illness just a year before (in fact, Lincoln still had a black ribbon attached to his hat as a sign he was in morning for his son), Lincoln was no doubt torn about having to leave--particularly because his wife Mary became distraught during the illness. Knowing how rail traffic could get tied up because of the effects of the war, Lincoln left the day before the ceremony for the 110 mile journey to ensure that he made the ceremony.

The Speech--as was his practice, Lincoln had been thinking about and writing down bits of this speech far in advance of actually giving it--and worked up to the last minute (and beyond) in polishing the work. Lincoln performed parts of the speech for close friends and associates, and worked on polishing the speech on both the train ride to Gettysburg as well as the night before and morning of the speech.

--"Four score and seven"

--"...dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal."

--"... we cannot dedicate--we cannot consecrate--we cannot hallow--this ground."

--"It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us ..."

--"...that government by the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth."


The Reaction--despite the accounts in many newspapers, the reaction of the crowd that witnessed the speech was stunned silence; the speech was over before many even realized it began. Opposition papers accused Lincoln of besmirching the memory of the dead, posthumously changing what they died for. In the days and weeks following the speech, however, it came to be recognized as a masterpiece of political rhetoric--and had remained so.

1863

I. Emancipation Proclamation

A. Preliminary Proclamation


1. Issued 22 September 1862--by the midsummer of 1862, Lincoln had decided to announce that the slaves held by belligerents on January 1, 1863, "would henceforth and forever by free."

2. Opposition to the Preliminary Proclamation--the preliminary emancipation proclamation stirred opposition within the Democratic Party and its adherents--both civilian and military.

a. Opposition within the military was particularly severe in the officer corps--although opposition was also expressed among the troops, as well.

b. Civilian opposition--prevalent among both War Democrats and Peace Democrats (the "Copperheads").

B. Suspension of Habeas Corpus


1. Announced by Lincoln September 1862--announced two days after issuing the preliminary emancipation proclamation. At the time this suspension was announced, Confederate forces had already attacked Kentucky and Maryland, and therefore threatened the border states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and threatened a further destabilization of Missouri

2. Criminalized Opposition to the War--made it illegal to advocate not enlisting in the Army, and any other actions that was seen as detrimental to the war effort--as interpreted in the field by sometimes overzealous army officers.


C. 1862 Fall Elections--the Democratic Party made some gains, especially in state legislatures, but did not win any governorships, only a minimal gain in the US House of Representatives, and lost four seats in the US Senate.

D. Foreign Affairs


1. Victory at Antietam/Sharpesburg--besides allowing Lincoln to finally issue his preliminary proclamation, this victory convinced Great Britain to wait before making any overtures that would favor recognition of the Confederate government.

2. Effect of Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation--denounced by pro-Confederate adherents, the preliminary proclamation clarified for outsiders that the war was being fought over the question of slavery, and made it much more difficult for either Great Britain or France to make any overtures that would favor the Confederate side.

E. Domestic reaction--ultimately, this action by Lincoln--following through and actually issuing the Proclamation--helped turn the tide of the war; but not everyone was convinced at the time this would be the case.

1. Drop in White Volunteers--whether a result of war weariness, or a negative reaction to the Emancipation Proclamation, the number of white volunteers dropped as the was began its third year.

2. Abolitionist Reaction--saw this as vindication for their position, but still accused Lincoln of moving too slowly, and not going far enough

3. Advocates of the Hard War--the string of Southern victories in the late spring and summer of 1862 made many in the North begin to advocate for making the secessionists suffer more during the war.

4. War Time Riots--for many poor and working-class people, the war was a threat to the livelihoods and to their families.

a. Cincinnati

b. Detroit

c. Toledo



II. Class Warfare on the Home Front


A. Recruitment of Black Soldiers--the Emancipation Proclamation paved the way not only for ending slavery, but for recognizing the recruitment of black soldiers into the military (the navy had long ignored such strictures)--and therefore extending to blacks the full rights of citizenship.

1. Louisiana--as one of the early areas to fall under Union control--and under the control of Gen. Benjamin Butler, the first Union general to recognize the legal status of "contrabands"--this area was among the first to begin enlisting blacks in the service.

2. South Carolina Sea Islands--especially around Port Royal (near present-day Hilton Head Island), under the command of abolitionist Thomas Wentworth Higginson, began recruiting black soldiers as part of the integrationist/uplift operation there.

3. Southern Reaction--threats to execute black soldiers and their white officers as insurrectionist (that was, to execute them without trial immediately).

a. Only carried out in a few cases (Fort Pillow Massacre, among others), but this led eventually to the suspension of the parole system, and the prison horrors of Andersonville, Libbey Prison, etc.

B. Richmond Bread Riot

1. Southern Conscription--the Confederacy was the first government to pass an universal conscription law--mandatory military service--known today as the "draft." Southern recruiting had dropped off precipitously, the desertion rate was higher, and the eligible population base was smaller.

2. Southern Impressment--because most of the fighting took place in the South, Southern food products were often approprated--or impressed--to feed troops from both the North and the South--usually with little meaningful compensation for the aggrieved party. This eventually created a large number of war refugees, as well, escaping conditions in the countryside.

3. Southern Starvation--plantations continued to plant cotton, while wholesalers warehoused food stocks to sell to the highest bidders

4. Richmond Women Attack Price Gougers


C. New York City Draft Riot

1. "Rich Man's War..."--the war was extremely profitable for businessmen, who found the government willing to pay top dollar for goods. The rich were also largely immune from the Conscription Act, because of the provision that allowed anyone who could paya $300 bounty to avoid service--the average yearly wage for a worker in the city.

2. "... Poor Man's Fight"--New York City government had been paying the bounty for working men who could not afford to pay it themselves, through a special tax assessment. With the more stringent Conscription Act, the city felt it could longer continue that practice.

3. White Worker Response--rampaged through New York City, attacking blacks, their property, and institutions--as well as representatives of the federal government

III. Gettysburg and Vicksburg


A. The Confederacy on the Attack--although the Confederacy looked to prevail in a war of attrition, Lee did not believe that resolve of the South could last long enough to conclude that kind of war successfully.

1. Chancellorsville--Lee victorious, but at great cost--loss of 13,000 men, including "Stonewall" Jackson.

2. Northern Virginia--where most of the fighting took place, was denuded of forage, and difficult to maintain troops in.

3. Joseph Hooker--after loss at Chancellorsville, Hooker was relieved of command, and replaced by George Meade.

4. Lee's Escape--while Lee and his army fought on for another year and a half after Gettysburg, this defeat removed some of aura of invincibility that Lee had operated under.


B. Grant's Victory at Vicksburg

1. Grant learned from the mistakes he had made the previous year.

2. Lee's planned attack of the North took away assets that could have been used to keep Vicksburg.

3. Grant's victory--went largely unnoticed in much of the East, being overshadowed by Gettysburg, but Lincoln took notice, and by the end of the year, Grant was at the head of the Army of the Potomac, and in charge of planning the war

Lincoln and Emancipation

I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored; the nearer the Union will be "the Union as it was." If there be those who would not save the Union, unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors; and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views.
--Abraham Lincoln to Horace Greeley, August 22, 1862

I. Emancipation and the War

A. Slavery and the Reasons for War--While most involved in 1861 would agree that slavery was the root cause of the war, few whites could be found who would advocate ending slavery as a way to shorten or end the war.

1. Proponents of Compromise--a number of Northern politicians advocated compromise with the Southern States as a means to end the secession crisis

2. Lincoln's refusal to compromise--Lincoln was willing to compromise with political opponents on a number of issues, but not on the issue of the extension of slavery.

a. Politics as the Art of Compromise--and Lincoln was a master politician

b. Lincoln to Lyman Trumbull on the issue of popular sovereignty in the Crittenden Compromise--"Stand firm. The tug has to come, and better now, than anytime hereafter."

c. Lincoln had long been an opponent of the expansion of slavery; this was the cornerstone principle of the Republican Party; Lincoln never compromised on this principle.

B. Lincoln's 1st Inaugural Address--"One section of our country believes slavery is right, and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is wrong, and ought to be restricted. That is the only substantial dispute."

1. 1st Inaugural Address Intended Audience--not really an attempt to persuade the South to give up the idea of secession, but to steel the resolve of people in the North for the coming battle.

2. Lincoln's promise not to interfere with slavery--"as it currently existed."

3. Lincoln maintained that he was upholding the law--that secession was unconstitutional, and as president he was sworn to uphold the constitution and the law.


C. Letters home--while newspapers were an important source of news and opinion, letters home from soldiers were also important in helping to shift public opinion on the emancipation of slaves.


1. Slaves as a Confederate source of labor--it quickly became apparent to soldiers that slaves performed much of the labor in the South, and that undercutting that source of labor would also undermine the war effort in that region.


2. Inhumanity of slavery--Southern insistence of the benign nature of slavery was undermined by the evidence of mistreatment as slaves began to stream into Union camps during the war.

II. Increased Influence of Abolitionists

A. Democratic void--with the withdrawal of Southern Democrats, abolitionists in the Republican Party became more influential, and the were able to pull the bodies politic into adapting more radical legislation--particularly when the war was going badly for the Union side.

1. McClelland's political ambitions--McClelland probably had political ambitions from the beginning, which may help to explain his lack of military success.

2.The momentum of war--the need to "rally 'round the flag" stunted early criticism of the war, and also the opposition to much of Lincoln's agenda.

B. Emancipation as a Tool of War

1. Striking at the Southern labor force.

2. Increasing Northern sentiment for a "hard" war--the early Confederate successes led many in the North to call for the prosecution of a "hard" war, that would be more debilitating on the South.

3. Slave as a "fifth column"--undoubtedly, some saw the potential of the promise of emancipation motivating slaves to act as a subversive force within the Confederacy.

III. Emancipation as a Wartime Expedient


A. Contrabands

1. Self-liberation--slaves quickly grasped the importance of the conflict, and many chose to liberate themselves.

2. Contraband--by military law, contraband property can be seized during a conflict, but must be returned to its lawful owner at the end of hostilities.

3. Gen. Benjamin Butler--commanded Fortress Monroe in May 1861 when a Confederate officer, claiming rights under the Fugitive Slave Act, demanded the return of his property. Butler refused (pointing out that Virginia claimed to be a sovereign nation, and therefore no longer covered by the Fugitive Slave Act), declaring the slaves "contraband."

a. Policy approved by Secretary of War Simon Cameron.

b. Butler's actions were not widely imitated--many Union generals were fearful of becoming responsible for a large number of escaped slaves, who they would then have to care for--one of the reasons most of these generals advised Lincoln against issuing an emancipation proclamation.

C. Who Decides Upon Emancipation?

1. John C. Fremont--Lincoln countermanded his emancipation of a select number of slaves in Missouri under martial law; later did the same when another Union general at Port Royal, SC, emancipated slaves under his command.

2. Bills of Attainder--Congress is prohibited by the Constitution from passing bills of attainder, or the uncompensated seizure of personal property; since slaves were considered personal property of slave owners, it was generally agreed--with important exceptions--that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to free the slaves.

3. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces--Lincoln argued that he alone, in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, had the authority to emancipate the slaves as a wartime expediency; Lincoln recognized that this authority would cease at the end of hostilities, but also recognized that the cat would be out of the bag by then, and wary about being placed back in.

IV. Emancipation and Political Expediency

A. Retaining the Loyalty of the Border States--Lincoln thought it necessary to retain the loyalty of the slave holding border states while the question of emancipation hung in the balance, or emancipation would become a moot point because the Confederacy would prevail.

1. Gradual, compensated emancipation--Lincoln proposed that slave owners in the border states be compensated, and the emancipated slaves colonized (South America? Caribbean?)

a. Rejected by border state politicians

b. The failure of gradual emancipation helped push Lincoln to acceptance of immediate emancipation, proclaimed by presidential fiat.


B. Antietam/Sharpsburg--Lee's defeat, after a long string of victories, provided Lincoln the opportunity to issue a preliminary emancipation proclamation that he had prepared a month previously

1. Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation--gave the states of the Confederacy 100 days (from September 22,1862 when it was issued to January 1, 1863) to surrender and retain their slaves, or to face the prospect of uncompensated emancipation in defeat.

C. Electoral setback--this proclamation cost the Republican Party in the 1862 elections, cutting into their numbers in both the House and the Senate. Lincoln was an astute politician, but one of strong moral principles, as well (LBJ and the Voting Rights/Civil Rights legislation?)

Lincoln and the Constitution

I. The Secession Crisis and the Constitution

A. Congressional sessions

1. Crittenden Compromise

2. Congress adjourns

B. The Secession Crisis

1. South Carolina

2. Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas quickly follow suit

C. Firing on Fort Sumter

1. Call-up of 90-day Volunteers

2. Entering Into Contracts

3. Post-facto authorization.

II. The Political Opposition

A. War Democrats


B. Peace Democrats--or "Copperheads," after the poisonous snake.

1. Argued secession was legal, because it wasn't prohibited in the Constitution.

2. Suspected that the Republican Party manuvered the South into taking the first shots to legitimize they new political agenda.

3. Suspected Lincoln of attempting to seize more power for the Executive Branch, create a stronger "unitary executive."

4. Many Peace Democrats were also white supermacist, and insisted that any attempt to free slaves would also degrade the white man.

5. Peace Democrats insisted upon a negotiated end to the hostilities, and assumed that somehow the country could return to the antebellum status quo

C. Clement Vallandigham

1. Scathing critic

III. Dissent and Habeous Corpus

A. Habeous corpus

B. Suspension of habeous corpus

C. Ex parte Meryman


1. John Merryman

2. Merryman's lawyer appeals to court

3. Taney travels to Baltimore


D. Ex parte Vallandigham

1. Arrest sparks Democratic protests

2. Corning Letter

3. Vallandigham nomination

The First Year of the War

I. Eastern Campaign

A. 1st Manassas/Bull Run

1. Gen. Winfield Scott

2. The Southern "Offensive-Defensive Strategy"--the Confederate strategy largely consisted of waiting out the North, in the hope that war weariness would set in. The South relied upon their internal lines of communication and familiarity with the terrain to bring enough force to the Union point of attack to have nearly equal numbers in particular battles. When the occasion presented itself, however, Confederate forces would go on the attack in the North.

3. Aftermath of Manassas--the decisive Confederate victory fed expectations of recognition by Great Britain and France and continued success on the battlefield for the South--while steeling resolve to fight on in the North.


B. Gen. George B. McClellan--brilliant administrator, horrendous field general. Vain and self-important. McPhearson makes the point that McClellan had enjoyed nothing but success in his life--and was therefore afraid of failure, and would take no action unless he was assured of its success.

II. The Diplomatic Campaign

A. King Cotton--the South was confident that the reliance of both Great Britain and France on cotton to fuel their industrial concerns would lead those countries to intervene on behalf of the South led planters to withhold from selling cotton in 1861 to "persuade" those countries to intervene soon.


B. Union Blockade--Lincoln, while insisting that the United States was not at war with the Confederacy, nonetheless ordered a blockade of Southern ports--an action only legal as an act of war. The blockade was largely ineffectual early in the conflict, ensnaring only one out of every six or seven ships, but the effort became more efficient as the conflict continued.

1. Cotton Boycott--the Confederate government attempted to persuade the British government that the blockade was ineffective--but the effectiveness of the cotton boycott belied that fact, since little cotton was reaching British docks.

2. North as a British trading partner--the North was an important trading partner with Great Britain, as well, and this played an important role in maintaining British neutrality.

a. Trent Affair

B. Union Naval Dominance


1. Merrimac




2. USS Monitor

3. Battle between Merrimac and the Monitor

4. Capture of Roanoke Island

III. Western Campaign

A. Missouri


1. John C. Fremont

2. August 30, 1861 proclamation--to combat Confederate sympathizers, Fremont declared martial law, announced the death penalty for Confederate guerrillas caught behind Union lines, and confiscated the property and slaves of all Confederate activists in the state.

3. Lincoln admonished Fremont not to execute anyone without his approval, and also asked him to amend his proclamation to bring it in line with Congressional legislation that confiscated property--including slaves--directly used to aid the Southern war effort. Fremont's refusal led to his reassignment.

B. Controlling the"Father of the Waters"

1. The Freshwater Navy

2. Southern Forts


3. "Pook's Turtles"

4. U.S. Grant


C. Shiloh